



Novel Insights, *An International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*

A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Research Journal

ISSN: 3048-6572 (Online) 3049-1991 (Print)

Impact Factor: 4.25 (IIFS), 8.2 (IJIN)

Volume-II, Special Issue, March 2026, Page No. 142-154

Published by Uttarsuri, Sribhumi, Assam, India, 788711

Website: <http://novelinsights.in/>

DOI: 10.69655/novelinsights.vol.2.issue.specialW.098



Nature of Vāda in Nyāya Philosophy

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Received: 25.03.2026; Accepted: 30.03.2026; Available online: 31.03.2026

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Abstract

According to nyaya there are three types of kothā, and among these, vāda (debate) is one. Katha that is conducted solely for ascertaining truth is called vāda; for this reason, many also refer to vāda as tattvabubhūtsukathā (discussion aimed at knowledge of reality). In Nyāya philosophy, what is called vāda is described by Dharmakīrti in his Vādanyāya as prapañcakathā or bistārakathā. Although the prapañcakathā accepted by Dharmakīrti appears similar to the vāda recognized in Nyāya, it is not actually vāda, because according to Nyāya, vāda (debate) can take place between a teacher and a student, or between two students belonging to the same tradition. However, according to Dharmakīrti, prapañcakathā can take place between any two individuals who are interested in acquiring knowledge on the same subject. Jain Acharya Vadideva Suri, while describing the characteristics of vāda, says that vāda is a form of reasoning that involves two sides: the proposition and the counter-proposition. On one side, a point is established, and on the other, it is refuted. He notes that both the jigīṣu (inquirer) and the tattva-nirṇayīṣu (one seeking to ascertain truth) can initiate the debate. However, the Nyāya tradition considers only tattvabubhūtsukathā as vāda and does not recognise the presence of jigīṣu in vāda. Thus, the question arises: Is vāda a form of tattvabubhūtsukathā or jigīṣu-initiated debate?

Keywords: Vāda, Pramānatarkasādhanōpālambhaḥ, siddhāntābiruddhaḥ, pañcābayabōpapannaḥ, pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha, avyupagamabyabasthā

There are three types of kathā: Vāda, Jalpa and Vitandā. Among these three forms of kathā (discussion), vāda is one of them. That form of debate whose only purpose is the establishment of truth is known as vāda; therefore, many also describe vāda as tattvabubhūtsukathā. While discussing vāda, Acharya Jayantabhatta said- “Vītarāgaiḥ śiṣyabrahmacāriṇi saha vādaḥ prayōktavyaḥ”¹ That is, the teacher (Guru) or instructor himself, being free from attachment and passions, should engage in debate (vāda) with his students and fellow learners. But why would a person choose to engage in such a debate (vāda)? In response to this question, it can be said that both the disputant (vādin) and the opponent (pratīvādin) engage in debate (vāda) for the determination of truth. When a

¹ Jayantabhatta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, edited by Nyāya Vyākaraṇāchārya Suryanarayana Sharma, Varanasi, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pustakalaya, 1992, p. 152.

student, having learned from the Nyāya standpoint that the self is eternal, encounters an atheist claiming that the self is non-eternal, he becomes doubtful – whether the self is eternal or non-eternal. At that point, the student, free from the question of victory or defeat (*jigyasashunya*), solely to remove doubt or attain true knowledge, approaches the teacher and expresses his desire. The teacher then engages in discussion with the student to resolve his doubt, and this variety of discussion is called *vāda* (debate). Therefore, the ancient authorities have said – “*Gurvādiviḥ saha vādaḥ*” That is, one should engage in debate (*vāda*) with the teacher as well as with fellow students. Acharya Jayanta Bhatta says that in *vāda* (debate), the arguments employed by the teacher are so flawless that, by merely hearing them, the doubts of the students regarding the subject under discussion are removed. According to Jayanta Bhatta, in this *vāda* (debate) there are two parties: the first is the learned, impartial teacher—free from attachment and aversion—who imparts true knowledge; and the second is the students or fellow learners. In this kind of debate, there is no trace of arrogance or vanity.

In Nyāya philosophy, what is called *vāda* (debate) is referred to by Dharmakīrti in his work *Vādanīyāya* as *prapañcakathā* or *vistarakathā*. According to him, in this *prapañcakathā* there is no role for victory or defeat. The disputant and the opponent rise above victory and defeat and engage in *prapañcakathā*; their sole aim is to attain true knowledge. Although the *prapañcakathā* accepted by Dharmakīrti appears similar to the *vāda* recognized in Nyāya, it is not actually *vāda*, because according to Nyāya, *vāda* (debate) should be conducted only among teacher and student, fellow learners (*brahmacārins*), as well as those who are well-versed in scriptural truth and seekers of the highest good.² In simple terms, *vāda* (debate) can take place between a teacher and a student, or between two students belonging to the same tradition. However, according to Dharmakīrti, *prapañcakathā* can take place between any two individuals who are interested in acquiring knowledge on the same subject.

The Advaita Vedāntin Adi Shankaracharya also accepts the *vāda* recognized by Maharṣi Gautama. According to him, even in *vāda* (debate), along with establishing one’s own position as the disputant, it is also necessary to refute the opponent’s position; otherwise, the objective of determining the truth cannot be achieved.³ Here a doubt arises: if, for seekers of liberation (*mumukṣu*), it is reasonable to determine truth merely by establishing one’s own position, then why should they, with an attitude of hostility, refute the views of others? It is true that merely establishing one’s own position is sufficient for the seeker of liberation (*mumukṣu*) to attain knowledge of truth, however, a person of dull intellect may think that since teachers like Kapila, Patanjali, and Kanada are worthy of reverence, their established doctrines must be accepted as true without question. But Adi Shankaracharya holds that although they are worthy of reverence, their doctrines may not necessarily be true; therefore,

² “*Taṁ śiṣya-guru-sabrahmacārī-biśiṣṭaśreṣṭhorthibhirasūyibhirabhyupeyāt*” –Maharshi Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* – 4/2/48.

³ “*Vedāntārthanirṇayasya ca samyagdarśanārthatvāt annirṇayena svapakṣa sthāpanam prathamam kṛtam tat hi abhyahitam parapakṣa pratyākhyānāt iti*” – Badarayan, *Brahmasūtra*, Shankaracharya, *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya*, translated by Vishvarupananda and edited by Citghanananda Puri and Ananda Jha, *Vedāntadarśanam* (Vol. II), Kolkata, Udbodhan Karyalay, 1996, p. 216.

in order to make such a dull-intellectual person understand this, it is necessary to demonstrate the inadequacy of those doctrines or refute them.⁴

In the *Bhāmatī tikā*, it is stated that a discourse motivated by the desire to determine truth (tattva-nirṇaya) is called vītarāga-kathā (dispassionate discussion). The disputant can never arrive at the determination of truth without addressing the defects in the opponent's view and refuting the objections or faults that the opponent raises against his own position. In a vītarāga-kathā, truth-determining discourse, the presence of the opponent's standpoint is always evident; it is never a case of the absence of an opposing view; but this does not in any way undermine the purpose or meaning of vītarāga-kathā.⁵ The disputant and the opponent are advised to engage in vāda (debate) free from attachment, passion, and similar emotions (rāgādisūṇya). That is, what is accepted as vāda in Nyāya is referred to in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* as sandhyāsaṃbhāṣā, by Dharmakīrti in *Vādanīyāya* as prapañcakathā, as tattva-bubhūtsu-kathā, and in the *Bhāmatī tikā* as vītarāga-kathā.

Jain philosophers have also regarded the debate of a vijigīṣu (one who desires victory) as vāda. In *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, Hemachandra states that since the occasion of defeat (nigrahasthāna) are also to be brought out in vāda (debate), the preservation of truth (tattvasamrakṣhaṇ) is achieved through vāda itself, for that, there is no need for jalpa or vitaṇḍā.⁶ According to him, through vāda (debate) itself it is possible to explain the reasoning of disputant and opponent who seek victory (vijigīṣu). Therefore, he speaks regarding the characteristics of vāda (debate), for the purpose of preserving truth, vāda (debate) is the discourse in which one presents one's own position and refutes the faults of the opponent before the prāśnikādi (vādin or prativādin, Savya, savāpati). Therefore, he rejects the jalpa and vitaṇḍā recognized in Nyāya for the preservation of truth. According to him, both the determination and preservation of truth are possible through vāda (debate) itself.⁷

The Jain Acharya Bāḍidevasūri, while describing the characteristics of vāda (debate), states that vāda is a form of reasoning in which there is a disputant and an opponent. On one side, a particular proposition is established, and on the other side, the exact opposite

⁴ "Nanu mumukṣhaṇām mōkṣhasādhanatvena samyagadarśananirūpaṇāya svapakṣhasthāpanameba kēbalaṃ karttuṃ yuktaṃ, kiṃ parapakṣhanirākaraṇena paradvēśakarēṇa? Bāḍhamebaṃ, tathāpi mahājanaparigrhītāni mahānti sāṅkhyāditantrāṇi" *Sharīrikabhāṣya* - 2/2/1 (Badarayan, *Brahmasūtra*, Shankaracharya, *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya*, translated by Vishvarupananda and edited by Citghanananda Puri and Ananda Jha, *Vedāntadarśanam* (Vol. II), Kolkata, Udbodhan Karyalay, 1996, p. 216.)

⁵ "Tattvanirṇayābasānā bitarāgakathā, na ca parapakṣhadūṣaṇamantareṇa tattvanirṇayaḥ śakyah karttūmi tattva-nirṇayāya bitarāgenāpi parapakṣho dr̥ṣyate, natu parapakṣhatareti, na bitarāgakathātvyāhatirityarthaḥ" - *bhāmatītikā* 2/2/1. Ibid - p. 216.

⁶ "Teṣāṃ ca nigrahasthānāntaropalakṣhaṇatvāt. Ataeba na jalpa bitaṇḍe kathe, vāda syaiba tattvasamrakṣhaṇārthatvāt". - Hemachandra, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, edited by Paṇḍit Sukhlal Ji Sanghavi, Ahmedabad, Sarasvatī Pustak Bhaṇḍar, 1989, p. 63.

"Ucitānām ca nigrahasthānānām vādeapi na virōdhosti". Ibid. p. 64

⁷ "Tattvasamrakṣhaṇārtham prāśnikādisamakṣham sādhanadūṣaṇavadanaṃ vādaḥ" ||30|| - Ibid. p. 63.

position is refuted.⁸ He states that this vāda (debate) can be initiated by both the vijigīṣu (one who seeks victory) and the tattva-nirṇayīṣu (one who wishes to determine the truth).⁹

However, the Nyāyikas recognize only tattvabubhūtsukathā as vāda; they do not, in any way, acknowledge the presence of a vijigīṣu (one seeking victory) in vāda (debate). Because in a discourse where a vijigīṣu (one seeking victory) is present, the determination of truth may not be possible. In short, the Jains endorse it as ‘vāda’ (debate), whereas the Nyāyikas recognize it as ‘kathā’ (discourse). Just as the Nyāyikas recognize two types of discourse – tattva-bubhūtsu-kathā and vijigīṣu-kathā – the Jain philosophers also accept two types of vāda (debate): in one type, the tattva-nirṇayīṣu (truth-seeker) participates, and in the other type, the vijigīṣu (one seeking victory) participates.

While describing the characteristics of vāda (debate), Maharshi Gautama said – “Pramāṇatarkasādhanōpālambhaḥ siddhāntābiruddhaḥ pañcābayābōpapannaḥ pakṣhyapratipakṣhaparigrahō vādaḥ”. 1/2/1. That is, in a vāda (debate), the disputant and opponent adopt mutually opposing positions on a subject (for example, ‘the self is eternal’ and ‘the self is non-eternal’), establish their own side using pramāṇa and tarka, and refute the opponent’s position. Moreover, the discourse follows sid’dhāntābirud’dhaḥ and pañcābayābōpapannaḥ (employs the five-membered syllogism), applying both the disputant’s and opponent’s statements. Such a discussion is called vāda (debate).

While explaining the term pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha (acceptance of disputant and opponent), the commentator states that in the same subject (adhikaraṇa) or dharmī, the mutually opposing doctrines acknowledged by the disputant and opponent are called pakṣha and pratipakṣha.¹⁰ The Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara states that in the same subject (adhikaraṇa) and at the same time, two mutually opposing qualities or doctrines are called pakṣha and pratipakṣha (disputant and opponent).¹¹ While explaining, Acharya Jayanta Bhatta says – parigraha is the method or arrangement for approach and acceptance of positions. For example, if one person says ‘sound is eternal’ and another says ‘sound is non-eternal,’ the acceptance of these mutually opposing positions as disputant and opponent constitutes vāda (debate).¹² The commentators Bātsyāyana and Uddyotakara also state that a subject is fit for debate when there is general knowledge of the object, but doubt arises regarding its specific characteristics. If the specific property is also certain, then there is no

⁸ “Viruddhayodharmavyavacchedena svikṛtatadanyadharmavyavasthāpanārtha sādhanadūṣaṇabacanaṃ vādaḥ. 8|1” – Vadideva Suri, *Pramāṇanyāyatattvalokālāṃkāra* (with English Translation and Commentary), edited by Dr. Hari Satya Bhattacharya, Bombay, Jain Sāhitya Vikash Mandal, 1967, p. 616.

⁹ “Prārambhakaścaatra jijñīṣuḥ, tattvanirṇāniṣuśca.” – 8.2, Ibid., p. 620.

¹⁰ “Ekādhikaraṇasthau viruddhau dharmmau pakṣhapratipakṣhau pratyanīkabhābāt, astyātmā nāstyātmēti” – Fanibhusan Tarkabagish, *Nyayadarshana* (Vol- I), with Gautama Sūtra and Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, Kolkata, Paschimanga Rajya Pustak Parshad, 2018, p. 367.

¹¹ “Bastudharmābekādhikaraṇau biruddhābekakālābaṇabasitau bastudharmābiti” – Uddyotakara, *Nyāyabhāṣyavārtika*, edited by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Bhāratīya Dārśanik Anusandhān Paṛiṣad, 1997, p. 138.

¹² “Pakṣhapratipakṣhau byākhyātau tayōḥ parigraho abhyupagamo niyamaḥ, eko bakti nityaḥ śabdaḥ aparastvanityaḥ śabdaḥ ityāhi – soyaṃ pakṣhapratipakṣhaparigrahō vādaḥ” – Jayantabhatta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, edited by Nyāya Vyākaraṇāchārya Suryanarayana Sharma, Varanasi, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pustakalaya, 1992, p. 250.

need for further debate in that case. Such a pair of object-properties, which is generally known but specifically doubtful, must be doubtful in the same subject (adhikaraṇa). Because if they belong to different subjects (adhikaraṇas), there is no need for their debate. Because both of those properties can be established through valid proofs (pramāṇa). For example, 'the self (atmā) is eternal' and 'the intellect (buddhi) is non-eternal.' Here, although eternal and non-eternal are mutually opposing properties, they belong to different subjects and can be established through valid proofs, so no self-contradiction is observed. Moreover, those specific properties must be mutually opposed. For only what is opposed requires debate; what is not opposed does not require debate. For example, the substance has qualities (dravyo guṇavān) and the substance has action (dravyo kriyāvān). Since these two properties of the substance are not mutually opposed, their presence in the substance can be established through valid proofs. Moreover, the mutually opposing properties must occur at the same time. Properties occurring at different times cannot be the subject of debate, because they can be established through proof. For example, a substance that is active at one time may be inactive at another time. Moreover, only that knowledge which is anabāsati (uncertain knowledge) requires debate. And knowledge that is already established does not require debate. Because once a determination (nirnaya) is made, there is no need for debate; therefore, after a determination, debate is unnecessary. All such mutually opposing properties with these characteristics constitute the pakṣha-pratipakṣha. It should be noted here that what is the disputant's pakṣha becomes the opponent's pratipakṣha, and what is the opponent's pakṣha becomes the disputant's pratipakṣha. For example, in the contradictory statement (vipratipatti-bākya) 'Is the self-eternal or not?' – 'the self is eternal' is the disputant's position pakṣha) and 'the self is non-eternal' is the disputant's counter-position (pratipakṣha); conversely, 'the self is non-eternal' is the opponent's position (pakṣha) and 'the self is eternal' is the opponent's counter-position (pratipakṣha).

Later, while explaining the meaning of the term 'parigraha', the commentator states – 'Parigrahōvyupagamabyabasthā' that is Parigraha is avyupagamabyabasthā, Acharya Jayanta Bhatta has expressed the same view. The meaning of 'avyupagama' is the method or arrangement of acceptance, Therefore, the substance is of this kind and not another – the arrangement of such acknowledgment is called avyupagama or parigraha. On this matter, Uddyotakara has said – "Tayōḥ parigrahō it' thambhābaniyamah, ēbam dharm'māyam dharm'mī naibam dharm'mēti" – That means this property (dharmin) possesses such a characteristic and not another; the acknowledgment of such a property of the dharmin constitutes the pakṣha-pratipakṣha parigraha (acceptance of disputant and opponent positions). When a vādin (disputant) asserts that the self-possesses the property of eternity and it cannot in any way possess non-eternity – thus acknowledging the vādin pakṣha (disputant's position) – and the opponent asserts exactly the opposite, that the self-possesses non-eternity and in no way eternity – thus acknowledging the prativādin pakṣha (opponent's position), then the acknowledgment of these mutually opposing positions regarding the self is called pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha. It should be noted here that this pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha is the very cause of the kathā (discussion) itself.

Here an objection is raised that if pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha is considered as vāda (debate), then it would be liable to the defect of ativyāpti as found in jalpa and vitandā. Because in jalpa and vitandā, such pakṣha-pratipakṣha are also present. In response, it is said: yes, that is true; since pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha is merely a property of the kathā,

it is only a universal characteristic of the kathā. But there is a special feature of vāda: in vāda, the establishment of a position is through ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’, whereas in jalpa and vitaṇḍā, the establishment of a position is through chhala and others (chhalādi). Therefore, a kathā (discussion) in which one establishes one’s own position and refutes the opponent’s solely through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning) is called vāda. Whereas a kathā (discussion) in which one establishes one’s own position and refutes the opponent’s using chhala, jāti, and nigrahasthāna (occasion of defeat) is called jalpa. Similarly, a kathā in which the first party establishes its position using chhala, jāti and nigrahasthāna but the second party does not establish its position, is called vitaṇḍā. It should be noted that vāda is ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’. Here, the term ‘sādhanā’ means establishment, and ‘upālambha’ means refutation.¹³ Therefore, ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ means the establishment of one’s own position through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning), and the refutation or objection of the opponent’s position also through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning). And for this reason, the commentator Bātsyāyana has said in the Vāda Sūtra Bhashya (commentary of vāda sūtra) – “Tasya biśeṣaṇam, pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ pramāṇatarkasādhanam pramāṇatarkopālambha” That is, the characteristic is ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’, which means the establishment of one’s own position through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning), and the refutation of the opponent’s position also through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning).

The question arises: how does the term ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ distinguish vāda from jalpa and vitaṇḍā? Or is it the case that, like ‘pakṣha-pratipakṣha-parigraha’, it is equally present in all three types of kathā? In response, it is said: no, it is not the same. Establishment and refutation through pramāṇa (valid proofs) and tarka (reasoning) constitute vāda, whereas establishment and refutation through chhala, jāti and nigrahasthāna jalpa and vitaṇḍā. The Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara has tried to explain this matter by giving an example, He said, for example, that although a cow (go) and a boselaphus tragocamelus (gavaya) share all other characteristics, they are distinguished from each other by the presence or absence of a dewlap (galakamvala). The one with a dewlap is a cow, and the one without it is a boselaphus tragocamelus (gavaya). Similarly, ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ distinguishes vāda from jalpa and vitaṇḍā.

Here, Acharya Jayanta Bhatta of the *Nyāyamañjarī* raises a possible objection and refutes it. The objection he raises is as follows: if pratyakṣha (perception) is para-pratīti-anupāyatvāt, then it cannot serve as a means for the opponent, because pratyakṣha (perception) is only the means for one’s own perception. That is, the pratyakṣha (perception) of the pot by person ‘A’ will be the cause of A’s own knowledge of the pot. It can never be the cause of person B’s knowledge of the pot. Then how can it (pratipakṣha) establish one’s own position and refute the opponent’s position in vāda? Farther, it is not possible to establish (sādhanā) one’s own pakṣha through tarka, because tarka is non-valid (apramā), and Maharshi Gautama does not accept establishment (sādhanā) through non-valid (apramā) means. Therefore, if it is not possible to establish one’s own position through tarka,

¹³ “Sādhanam sthāpanā, upālambhaḥ pratiśēdhaḥ” – Fanibhusan Tarkabagish, *Nyayadarshana* (Vol-I), with Gautama Sūtra and Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, Kolkata, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustak Parshad, 2018, p. 367.

it is likewise impossible to refute the opponent's position through tarka. Then, how can tarka serve as the means for establishing one's own position and refuting the opponent's position in vāda? In response, he says: this is true, but the term 'pramāṇa' does not refer only to perception (pratyakṣa); it also includes inference (anumāna-pramāṇa) and its essential components (avyaya). Here it is said that through the five members (pañcāvya) of a syllogism, establishment and refutation can be achieved. Although tarka by itself is non-valid (apramā), that is, incapable of directly establishing one's own position or refuting the opponent, it serves as a helper (anugrahaka) to the pramāṇa. Therefore, it can sequentially (paramparā) establish one's own position and refute the opponent's position.¹⁴ "In the Tarka Sūtra Bhashya, the commentator Bātsyāyana said – "Pramāṇavyanujñānāt pramāṇasahito bādeapadiṣṭa iti" That is, tarka removes doubt and directs the pramāṇa to examine its own subject; therefore, tarka is mentioned in the subsequent characteristic of vāda. The Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara has also expressed agreement on this matter. He says that non-valid (apramā) tarka is not itself the cause of establishment and refutation; rather, it serves to consider the subject of the valid means (pramāṇa). Tarka thus acts as a helper (anugrahaka) to the pramāṇa.¹⁵ Regarding tarka, it can be said that when a question about the truth of a substance arises, doubt arises concerning the mutually opposing properties of that substance. Then, the doubter later gives 'anujñā' – that is, acceptance or authorization based on valid inference (upapatti-prayukta) – to one of the opposing properties of the subject of doubt. Such knowledge in the form of this anujñā is what is called tarka.¹⁶

Here, another objection is raised: what is the nature of the establishment (sādhana) and refutation (upālambha) mentioned in the sūtra? If it is understood as bhāvasādhya (as denoting the act/result), then its meaning would be establishment (siddhi) and refutation (upālambha). And if it is taken in the sense of 'bhāvabācya' (as denoting the act/result), then one's own position can be established or achieved (siddhi) through pramāṇa and tarka, but the opponent's refutation (upālambha) cannot be accomplished, because they are non-counteracting with respect to the other's position (paramata-apratipādakatva). That is, pramāṇa and tarka cannot establish the opponent's position, because the viewpoint of the other cannot be an object of our perception. Because if the opponent's view were to become an object of our perception, then it would be established as real; because according to Nyāya, that which is unreal (asat) cannot be perceived. Consequently, its refutation (upālambha) would never be possible, because how can something that has already been established be refuted? Therefore, we cannot say that the opponent's position becomes an object of our perception. And since the opponent's position is not an object of our perception, it cannot be refuted (upālambha) through pramāṇa and tarka. Therefore, sādhana (establishment) and upālambha (refutation) cannot be understood in the sense of 'bhāvabācya' (as denoting the

¹⁴ Jayantabhatta, Nyāyamañjarī, edited by Nyāya Vyākaraṇāchārya Suryanarayana Sharma, Varanasi, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pustakalaya, 1992, p. 150.

¹⁵ "Brūmaṇ siddhy-upālabdhyoḥ kāraṇam, api tu pramāṇaviṣayābivecanāt tarkaḥ pramāṇānyanugrṇāti." - Uddyotakara, Nyāyabhāṣyavārtika, edited by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Bhāratīya Dārśanik Anusandhān Pariṣad, 1997, p. 139.

¹⁶ "Abijñāyamānatattvearthe jijñāsā avajjāyate jāniya imamiti. Atha jijñāsitasya vastuno vyāhatam dharmo vibhāgena bimarśati kiṃsvidityebamāhosvinnāivamiti." - Fanibhusan Tarkabagish, Nyayadarshana (Vol- I), with Gautama Sūtra and Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, Kolkata, Paschimanga Rajya Pustak Parshad, 2018, p. 345.

act/result). Again, if they are taken in the instrumental sense (karaṇabācyā), then the meanings of the pañcāvayava would already be included within the terms sādhana and upālambha. Hence, there would be no need for the separate mention of 'pañcāvayavopapanna' in the sūtra. Therefore, the terms sādhana (establishment) and upālambha (refutation) cannot be understood either in the sense of bhāvabācyā or karaṇabācyā. Hence, the question arises: in what sense, then, should these two terms be understood?

In response, it is said that the terms sādhana (establishment) and upālambha (refutation) can be understood in both senses – bhāvabācyā (as denoting the act/result) and karaṇabācyā (as denoting the means). Even if these two terms are understood in the karaṇabācyā and thereby include the five members pañcāvayava, still the mention of 'pañcāvayavopapanna' in the sūtra does not become redundant. Because the term 'pañcāvayavopapanna' has been added for another reason, which will be explained later. And if it is taken in the sense of bhāvabācyā, then the doubt arises that pramāṇa and tarka cannot refute the opponent's position, since they are non-establishing with respect to another's view (paramata-apratipādaka). According to the Vārtikakāra, this is true – i.e., the opponent's standpoint cannot become an object of our perception. Therefore, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara says – "Na vrumaḥ pratipakṣhabīṣaya upālambha iti, kiṃ tu sādhanabīṣayaḥ" That is, the refutation mentioned here is not of the opponent's subject itself, but of the means used to establish the opponent's position. And since that sādhana is within our scope of cognition, no objection arises here.

Here again an objection is raised: when the term upālambha is used in the presence of the opponent, how can it denote the means of establishing (sādhana) the opponent's position rather than the opponent itself? In response, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara says that this is determined by capability (sāmarthya) and incapability (asāmarthya). That is, only that which is fit for refutation should be refuted; the opponent's position itself is not fit for direct refutation.¹⁷ Because whether there is refutation (upālambha) or non-refutation, the nature of the opponent's position itself is not affected. But by the same reasoning, the nature of the sādhana also cannot be affected. Therefore, the idea of refuting the opponent's sādhana does not appear to be logically justified.

Therefore, in this way, no refutation would be possible at all – neither of the effect nor of the cause. Because each of them has the capacity with respect to its own domain; that is, every effect and cause is supported by its own respective object. And where there is incapacity (asāmarthya) with respect to that object, there neither the effect nor the cause exists. Now the question arises – then whose refutation (upālambha) will take place there? In response, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara says – 'yo'yaṃ nigṛhyate', that is, the one who is to be defeated (nigṛhīta) is the one whose refutation (upālambha) takes place. Now the question is: who is to be defeated (nigṛhīta)? In response, it is said that it is the person (puruṣa) who is defeated. Non-comprehension (apratipatti) and vipratipatti belong to the person, not to the cause or the effect. The properties of that person are revealed through their own statements, and it is precisely those person-specific properties – brought to light by

¹⁷ "Yadupālambhyayogyaṃ tadupālambhyate, na ca pratipakṣha upālambhyayogyaḥ." – Uddyotakara, Nyāyabhāṣyavārtika, edited by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Bhāratīya Dārśanik Anusandhān Pariṣad, 1997, p. 140.

their statements – that become the object of refutation (upālambha). Here, another question is raised: how do we derive this meaning from the sūtra? In reply, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara says that the expression ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ means the establishment (sādhana) through pramāṇa and tarka, and the refutation (upālambha) of that very establishment through pramāṇa and tarka. Because ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ actually stands for ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanaśca pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambhaśca’. Here, one occurrence of the word sādhana is omitted. For example, the word uṣṭramukhī is derived from the expression ‘uṣṭrasya mukhamiva mukham yasyāḥ sā’ (she/he whose face is like the face of a camel). Here, one occurrence of the word mukha (face) is elided.¹⁸

Regarding this qualifier ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’, the author of the Nyāyasiddhāntamālā has addressed another possible doubt. He says that the expression pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ denotes not only establishment and refutation through valid means (pramāṇa) and reasoning (tarka), but also establishment and refutation through fallacious means (pramāṇābhāsa) and fallacious reasoning (tarkābhāsa). According to him, since the primary aim of vāda is the determination of truth (tattva-nirṇaya), fallacious means such as pramāṇābhāsa and tarkābhāsa cannot be deliberately employed there. However, in jalpa and vitaṇḍā, where mere victory is the objective, their use is permissible. If, during vāda, a disciple unknowingly employs pramāṇābhāsa or tarkābhāsa, then the teacher will point out that such fallacious reasoning has been used. Similarly, if the teacher commits such an error, the disciple will also point it out.

Earlier, an objection was raised that the use of the term ‘pañcāvayavopapanna’ in the vāda-sūtra is redundant or unnecessary. Here, that objection is being refuted, and the necessity of the term ‘pañcāvayavopapanna’ is being explained.

From the definition that jalpa is the establishment and refutation through chhalādi (chhala, jāti and nigrāsthāna), it may appear that vāda, being the opposite of jalpa, excludes such devices—i.e., that in vāda, the use of nigrāsthāna is prohibited. The Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara says that from the definition ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ as vāda, it is understood that even in vāda there is the presence of nigrāsthāna. Because wherever the term upālambha or its synonyms are heard, there is the presence of nigrāsthāna. But if this is accepted, then no distinction would remain between jalpa and vāda. In response, it is said: no, they are not the same, because in vāda not all nigrāsthānas are admitted. Now an objection is raised: if that is so, then vāda would become a kind of jalpa. That is, vāda would be a particular type of jalpa in which only some nigrāsthānas are mentioned, whereas jalpa would be the general type in which all nigrāsthānas are admitted. In response, it is said: no, they cannot be the same. Because jalpa is a discourse motivated by the desire to win (vijigīṣu-kathā), whereas vāda is a discourse devoid of such a desire to win. Therefore, vāda can never be jalpa.

By the two terms ‘pañcāvayavopapanna’ and ‘siddhāntāviruddha’, it is indicated which nigrāsthānas (points of defeat) are to be identified in vāda. Some hold that by the term ‘pañcāvayavopapanna’, the nigrāsthānas called deficiency (nyūna) and excess (adhika)

¹⁸ “Pramāṇatarkasādhanaḥ pakṣhaḥ, pramāṇaus tarkeṇa ca sādhanasyaupālambhaḥ. Pramāṇatarkasādhanaśca pramāṇatarkasādhanaopālambhaśca pramāṇatarkasādhanaopālambhaḥ. Ekasya sādhanashabdasya gamyamānārthatvāt lopaḥ, yathoṣṭramukhī kanyeti.” – Ibid p. 140.

are to be indicated in vāda. That is, if the vādin or the prativādin, while supporting their own position, fails to mention any one of the pañcāvayava, then the nigrasthāna called deficiency (nyūna) arises. And if they mention more than the required avayava, or introduce unnecessary additional reasons (hetu) and examples (udāharaṇa), then the nigrasthāna called excess (adhika) arises. The commentator has also explained it in this way. While explaining the necessity of the term 'siddhāntāviruddha' mentioned by maharṣi Gautama in the definition of vāda, the commentator has referred to the definition of the fallacy of contradictory (viruddha hetvābhāsa). Therefore, even in vāda, it is necessary to identify the viruddha hetvābhāsa. Is it only the viruddha hetvābhāsa? In response, some scholars explain the commentator's statement by saying that, by mentioning the definition of viruddha hetvābhāsa, he actually intended to indicate that the nigrasthāna called hetvābhāsa is to be identified in vāda. Later, while explaining the definition of viruddha hetvābhāsa, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara hetvābhāsa.says, all types of hetvābhāsa are included under viruddha hetvābhāsa. At this point, Acharya Jayantabhatta says, - "... Bhāṣyakāra bacanātpramāṇapadena ca tanmūlāvaṣṭakṣepātpramāṇābhāsamūlanirāsē sati sakalahetvābhāsodbhāvanamapi tatra siddhamiti" That is, according to Acharya Jayanta Bhatta, from the statement of the commentator, and from the primary implication (mukhyārtha) we derive, it becomes clear that by the term 'siddhāntāviruddha' one should understand all types of hetvābhāsa-this is established. Therefore, in order to indicate that even in vāda there is a need to identify the nigrasthāna called hetvābhāsa, Maharshi Gautama has included the term 'siddhāntāviruddha' in the vāda-sūtra. That is, during a vāda between teacher and disciple, if there is any hetvābhāsa in the disciple's reasoning, the teacher will point it out and correct it. Likewise, if the teacher, by mistake, employs any fallacy, it is the duty of the disciple to bring that fallacy to the teacher's attention.

However, the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara gives a different explanation. According to him, by the term 'pañcāvayavopapanna', not only the nigrasthānas called deficiency (nyūna) and excess (adhika) are implied, but also the fallacies of the avayava (avayavābhāsa) are included. He said - "pañcāvayavopapanna iti pañcagrahaṇāt nyunādhike labhyatē. Avayavagrahaṇāt tadābhāsā labhyanta iti". That is, by the inclusion of the term 'pañca' (five) in 'pañcāvayavopapanna', the nigrasthānas called nyūna and adhika are implied. And by the inclusion of the term 'avayava', the avayavābhāsa are implied. And since avayavābhāsa is included, its root, namely hetvābhāsa, is also included. Because if an asat hetu is employed, it will constitute not only a hetvābhāsa but also an avayavābhāsa.

If the above explanation of the Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara is accepted, then the question arises: what is the necessity of the term 'siddhāntāviruddha'? Does its inclusion become redundant? In response, the Vārtikakāra says - "Nānarthakam, apasiddhāntabirodhārthatvāt." That is, the term 'siddhāntāviruddha' in the definition of vāda is not redundant; it is used for the purpose of preventing apasiddhānta (self-contradictory conclusion). Therefore, in vāda, an apasiddhānta cannot be accepted. If it is accepted, it constitutes a nigrasthāna called apasiddhānta, and if anyone errs in this respect, it must be pointed out. On this matter, the Vārtikakāra has cited the sūtra concerning the apasiddhānta nigrasthāna.

Some, in support of the commentator, have stated that the commentator himself admits that even in vāda there is a need for the nigrasthāna called apasiddhānta. Therefore, while explaining the necessity of the term 'siddhāntāviruddha', he mentions the phrase 'kasya-

cid-avyanujñānārthaṃ' in his commentary. Furthermore, often vāda proceeds without explicit use of the pañcāvayava, yet even there, the need to point out the hetvābhāsa exists. For this, the commentator explains that the primary meaning of the term 'siddhāntāviruddha' is to indicate the necessity of the nigrāsthāna called hetvābhāsa. Here, a question may arise: if vāda can occur without the use of the pañcāvayava, then how can the definition or characteristic of vāda be indicated by it? It should be noted here that the two terms pañcāvayavopapanna and siddhāntāviruddha are not essential conditions or qualifiers of vāda; rather, they are sufficient conditions. Therefore, vāda can take place even without them. Here, an objection is raised: if vāda can occur without these two terms, then there is no need to include them in the definition of vāda. In response, it is said that if these two terms are not mentioned in the definition, then the definition would be defective due to incompleteness (avyāpti). That is, Maharshi Gautama has included these two terms in the vāda-sūtra in order to indicate that wherever these nigrāsthānas are present, they also fall within the scope of vāda.

Here, another objection is raised: when the term 'pañcāvayavopapanna' is included in the definition of vāda, it implies that in vāda, establishment (sādhana) and refutation (upālabha) occur through pramāṇa and tarka. Because when we apply the pañcāvayava to the thesis and related statements, we must also accept the underlying pramāṇa. Because the pañcāvayava are always used for establishing something. And when we are proving, it goes without saying that the tarka, which is necessarily employed to support the pramāṇa, must also be accepted. Therefore, it is clear that vāda is never possible solely by the pañcāvayava without pramāṇa and tarka. This gives rise to the question: why then does Maharshi Gautama explicitly mention pramāṇa and tarka separately? We also cannot say that the reason is to prohibit excess in jalpa and vitaṇḍā, because the statements by which one's own position is established and the opponent's is refuted through chhalādi belong to jalpa, and those by which one's own position is established and the opponent's refuted through pramāṇa and tarka belong to vāda. According to Nyāya, this is not correct. The commentator states that there are many instances where jalpa occurs through pramāṇa and tarka. Therefore, even in the definition of jalpa, the expression pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ is necessary. Thus, in the context of jalpa, the term 'yathāktopapanna' cited in its definition encompasses the term pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ as used in the definition of vāda. Consequently, the concern of excess in the definition of jalpa cannot be used to explain the necessity of the term 'pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ' as mentioned by Maharshi Gautama in the definition of vāda.

In response to the above point, the commentator Baṭṭsayana has explained the threefold necessity of the term 'pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ' as applied in the definition of vāda—

According to the commentator, merely establishing one's own position through the pañcāvayava does not constitute vāda. For vāda to occur, along with the establishment of one's own position, refutation of the opponent's position is also necessary. However, by the term pañcāvayavopapanna alone, the need for refutation of the opponent cannot be conveyed. Therefore, to indicate both the establishment of one's own position and the refutation of the opponent, as well as the vyatiṣaṅga- Samvandha between them, Maharshi Gautama has employed the term 'pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ'. In this context, the commentator's statement is— "avaḃaveṣu pramāṇatarkāntarbhābe

prthakapramāṇatarkagraṇam sādhanopālambhavyatiṣaṅgajñāpanārtham” – That is, even though pramāṇa and tarka are implied in the avayava, and thus are obtained through the term pañcāvayavopapanna, they are mentioned separately to indicate the vyatiṣaṅga-Samvandha between sādhana and upālambha. What is the vyatiṣaṅga? It is the reciprocal relation between the two parties: just as the disputant establishes their own position and refutes the opponent through pramāṇa and tarka, similarly the opponent also establishes their own position and refutes the disputant through pramāṇa and tarka. If it were otherwise – that is, if the disputant and opponent each only establish their own position through the pañcāvayava without refuting the other’s position – then it would not constitute a valid vāda. And the vyatiṣaṅga relation between sādhana and upālambha cannot be explained by the term pañcāvayavopapanna alone; it can only be indicated by the separate mention of pramāṇa and tarka.

The commentator, mentioning another necessity, says: ‘tenāpi kalpena sādhanopālambhō vāde bhavata iti jñāpayati’, that is, the term ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ is included in the vāda-sūtra to indicate that it constitutes yet another type of vāda. On this matter, the tatparyotikākāra Bācaspati Miśra also says: ‘vādaḥ pañcāvayavopapanna ityekaḥ kalpaḥ, pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ iti dvitīya ityārthaḥ’, meaning that in vāda there are two alternatives, or that vāda occurs in two ways. The two alternatives of vāda are, respectively, pañcāvayavopapanna and pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ. Therefore, Maharshi Gautama has mentioned the term ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ in the definition of vāda to explain that valid debate for the determination of truth can occur even without the application of the pañcāvayava.

As a third necessity, the commentator says that because jalpa explicitly mentions chhalādi, many might think that the statements in which one’s own position is established and the opponent’s refuted through chala, jāti, and nigrāsthāna belong to jalpa, and those in which one’s own position is established and the opponent’s refuted through pramāṇa and tarka belong to vāda. However, according to Nyāya, this is not correct. The commentator states that there are many instances where jalpa occurs solely through pramāṇa and tarka. Therefore, in the definition of vāda, the term ‘pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ’ is mentioned. This is because, in the definition of jalpa, the term yathāktopapanna includes this qualifier of vāda within the scope of jalpa as well. It should be noted here that when one’s own position is established and the opponent’s refuted through pramāṇa and tarka without any desire for victory, it is called vāda. On the other hand, if a person establishes their own position and refutes the opponent through pramāṇa and tarka with the desire for victory (vijigīṣu), even if chala, jāti, and nigrāsthāna are absent, it is considered jalpa.

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