A
Peer-Reviewed Bi-monthly Research Journal
ISSN: xxxx-xxxx
Volume-I,
Issue-I, May 2024, Page No.60-66
Published by
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DOI:
………………………….
Issues of Eternal Jīvātmā: A Review Based on Nyāya Philosophy
Debashis Ghosh
Post Graduate
Department of Philosophy, Rabindra
Bharati University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India
Email:- ghoshdebashis354@gmail.com
Received: 03.04.2024;
Accepted: 13.05.2024; Available online: 31.05.2024
©2024
The Author(s). Published by Uttarsuri Publication.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
Abstract:
Maharishi Gautama discusses the sixteen
types of substances in the first Sūtra of the
first ahnika of the first chapter of the Nyāyadarshan. According to the principles of Nyăya philosophy, the second substance is the Prameya or the knowledge. Prameya
or the knowledge are twelve substances. The first known substance of these is
the soul. Ātman is the creator of all happiness
and sorrow, the consumer of happiness and sorrow, the knower of happiness and
sorrow. The soul is eternal, embodied, beginningless and many in number. The
soul is dual. Namely:-1.Jīvātmā, 2.Paramătmă. Tattva knowledge
about soul-like matter leads to salvation by discarding all false knowledge of
that subject. The main topic of this article is to discuss eternal life based
on Nyăya philosophy. But there are many doubts about
whether the soul is eternal. Therefore, in Nyăya
philosophy, Vedas have accepted the eternality of life by neutral reasoning.
Keywords:-Ātman, Jīvātmā,Eternity, Immortality, Emanation and
Purification, Rebirth of Soul, Transientism,
Apparition.
Nyăyadarshan
admits the additional soul of the body, but the doubt whether that soul is
eternal or impermanent (not nitya) cannot be removed.
Because ‘existing matter is of two types, eternal and Non-eternal’. Now the
question is what is eternal? The answer can be said, that which is Apratiyogin by antecedent and Apratiyogin
by destruction is eternal. Hence, which is beginningless and infinite is
eternal.
Of course,
while proving that there is a soul in addition to the body, it is proved by
Recognition that the soul that is present in the old body was also present in
the previous childhood body of that body. But what is the proof that this soul
will exist even after leaving the body? In the Vedas Says, of course, the soul
is called Eternal (nitya). It is said in Chandogya Upanishads that the body dies, but the living
being is abandoned. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishads
says – the soul kills this body and assumes another body and takes you there.
It is said in the Gita- He who knows this Atman as imperishable, eternal,
birthless and eternal, etc. But those who do not accept the authority of the
Vedas and Gita will not be satisfied with this statement. That is why the Nyăya Darshan Veda Pramăna has
established the eternality of the soul through Neutral reasoning.
Nyāyadarshan says that Newborn babies do not know the
reasons for joy, fear and grief, because they have no experience of all these
things. Moreover, after getting something, they get angry, and if they don’t
get something, they get sad. We can guess this intense grief by seeing his
laughter and crying. Since he did not experience happiness or sorrow in the
present birth due to the attainment or non-attainment of objects, it is proved
that this harsha or sorrow arose due to the
recollection of previous things. Remembrance does not happen without prior
experience, prior experience is also possible only if there is previous birth
in this case. Therefore, it can be concluded that this embodied soul continues
to exist even after the destruction of a previous body.
Now the Pūrvapakṣa-vădi can say’s just as there is
development and compression in the eternal lotus, the eternal soul will also
undergo a harshashoka form. For this what is the need
for Previous births or eternal life of the soul?
The commentator Vătsyăyana
replies that the illustration is given, but no motive is mentioned, so the
illustration fails. Moreover, this example does not exclude the child’s reason
for grief. If the young or the old have a preconceived grief, if there is a
predisposing cause to the recollection, such a cause is inevitable for the
newborn child. By the verb, the cause of the verb is also assumed. There
is, of course, a reason for the prabodha and
conjugation of padmapatra verbs. As a matter of fact,
the lotus produced from the mixture of Panchabhuta
has the characteristics of summer, winter and rainy season. There is a reason
for emotional changes in children like joy, fear and grief etc. And that reason
cannot be anything other than pre-habitation, pre-habitation also allows
previous birth, the soul exists even after leaving the body, hence it is
eternal. Proving that Another special proof
beginningless of the soul is the desire to suckle the newborn child. At birth,
the baby has the instinct to suckle. This instinct indicates his desire. This
desire is not possible without the recollection of hunger suppression due to
previous breastfeeding, so this desire is a sign of pre-habituation. If a
newborn child’s preconceptions are to be followed, it completes the previous
birth itself.
The immanentists of the soul object that the iron moves towards
the magnet without habit, just as the child moves towards the mother’s breast
without habit.
The eternalist theorists of the soul say, is the iron
that moves towards the magnet, it is pure or non-pure? If there is non-pure,
then the iron will also move towards magnet. In fact, iron moves towards iron
and that iron also does not move towards any stone etc
other than iron. By this law of motion, the law of its cause is fulfilled. So,
when the newborn baby is hungry and moves towards the mother’s breast, there is
a specific reason for this movement. The habit of eating after birth can have
no other motive than the remembrance of hunger. Therefore, because there is no
pure instinct, the eternality of the soul is achieved in absolute perfection by
the desire to suckle.
Patanjali, in his yogasūtra,
says:
‘svarasavahi vidusho
‘pi tatha rudho ‘bhiniveshah’
That is,
that which originates from the previous fear of death and which is present even
in learned persons is called abhinivesha. By fearing
the death of the animal in the present birth, he has created the sense of the
death of the previous birth and thereby the existence of the previous birth.
Commenting on the Patanjalasūtra, Maharishi
Vedavyas said, ‘All beings always have this desire in themselves, that I may
not come to impermanence, that I may live. He who has not experienced death as
the soul’s exodus can never have this form of desire. This indicates that there
is a sense of previous birth. If there is a sense of previous birth, then the
previous birth is complete.
A further
proof of the impermanence of the soul is the lack of desireless beings in all
things. All beings are born with desires. Remembrance of the past is the source
of desire or anger. Precognition is not possible through pre-birth, therefore
there must be pre-birth, the soul is eternal. Maharishi Gautama previously
applied the innate anger of the child mother at birth to the perpetuation of
the soul by saying that the infant’s longing for the breast is a sign of birth.
Atheists
may say of course – how can it be known that the desires of the newborn animal
are due to the feelings of the previous birth? Just as the qualities of utpati dharmaka dravya are produced by a cause, so the quality of utipati dharmaka atman is also
produced by a cause. When ghat arises, its form etc. qualities arise, when that
form of soul arises, ragas arise in it. So what is the need for acknowledgment
of previous birth?
The Naiyayikas reply to the objections of the Atheists that
there must be a need for it. Because soul and anger do not originate like saguna originates. Desire for wonder or anger arises from
determination. Preconceived prayer is determination. This prayer is for the
recollection of preconceived matters. So it can be assumed that the newborn
child is angry because of the recollection of preconceived matters. The memory
of preconceived matters undoubtedly perfects the previous birth.
If there
was an origin of the soul, then the quality of raga could have originated in
it, just like the origin of the quality in the work. But the origin of the soul
is not perfect, so the example of the origin of the rupadi
guna to cause action is asidva.
And if one rejects Sankalpa and calls ignorance in the form of dharmadharma the cause of anger, then only previous births
are accepted. Because that dharma dharma originated
in the previous body, not in this life.
According
to Buddhism, which is the existence (sat) is impermanent. Which is the
existence (sat) is transitory, so the soul is the existence (sat) is
transitory. If the soul is transitory, then the permanence of the soul
recognized by Nyăyadarshan becomes fragile.
Maharishi Gautama showed the inadequacy of ephemerally
in the second Ănvīsikī of the third chapter
of Nyăyadarshan. Naiyaikacharya
Uddyotakara in the Chartudashasūtra
of the varttika has extensively discussed ephemeralism, refuting the phrase ‘everything is
temporary’, its middle term ‘sattva’ and examples such as ‘Jaldhar’. By searching
the various meanings of the word momentary, he found that the word momentary is
meaningless, nominal.
All those
arguments are not presented here for fear of elaboration. Since we will prove
the existence of the soul according to Nyăya, we will
establish the eternity of the soul by showing the error of this view because if
we do not refute the theory of the soul according to Buddhism, our work will
not be accomplished.
Indeed, which
is the existence(sat) is temporary. Therefore, the soul is also
Momentarians
accept the memory or recognition of visible objects. If the material moment is
destructive, the material that the soul has seen, As
it perishes at the second moment of the origin of the soul, not having the same
doer of remembrance of visions in the past, “I who saw it, I see it, how does
such remembrance arise? But similar experience is popular. Here also the
ephemeral ‘I saw’, thus knowing me as the doer of vision and recollection. How
will he invite the self-interview in the form of ‘Aham’ i.e. I? Therefore the
soul is not transient.
Remembrance
arises as a result of Impressions of karmic forces (samskāra)
and recollection is not possible unless the soul who is the doer of that Impressions
of karmic forces (samskāra) is also not up to
the time of remembrance. According to momentarynism,
reformation also perishes at the second moment of origin. The soul is also
subject to that rule. Therefore, remembrance does not arise. This results in a
sense of memory in reality, and thus the inferential function is continuously
going on. Momentary recollection of the soul is impossible, because what is
seen by one soul cannot be remembered by another soul, then the soul is
impermanent and ephemeral.
Buddhists
believe in causation. This is the conclusion of the Buddhists that decay causes
new creation and new creation is the function of that decay. Now the question
is, can causation arise at once? If the cause does not exist immediately prior
to the action, how is it caused? Two objects at the same time are not causally
related. According to the momentarians, the birth of
the soul, its materialization, the origin of its reformation are completed in a
single moment. In fact the soul is the cause of happiness and sorrow and
happiness and sorrow are the effect of the soul. The soul is the cause of
happiness and misery, just as it is needed at the time of the origin of
happiness as well as before the origin of happiness. Because if not, where will
the helpless happiness and sorrow arise? According to momentarians,
permanence is not possible in the second moment of origin of the soul. Because
the happiness of the soul is not caused by the cause of sorrow. But actually
the soul is the cause of happiness and unhappiness therefore the soul is
eternal.
In fact,
according to Buddhism, the former soul is the cause of the new soul. The cause
must be present up to the time of origination because origination always waits
for the cause. All things can arise from all things by sudden origination. If
the Buddhist says that the former soul resides until the origin of the new
soul, then the co-existence of causality is admitted. But this contradicts the
promise that ‘all the existence(sat) things are temporary’.
Now the question is, when Buddhists accept
Impressions of karmic forces (samskāra), they
have to accept a refuge because impressions of karmic forces (samskāra) cannot be without refuge. Buddhists say that
the refuge of impressions of karmic forces (samskāra)
is the science of Ālaya-vijńāna. This is
the soul according to them due to the ephemerality of all things, this
cosmology is also ephemeral. But whose form does not exist for some time, how
can it be reformed? That which exists in the past, middle and hereafter, or any
witness material without decay, is the only one worthy of refuge for
reformation. If there is no such eternal substance, the reformation, memory, pratyabhijna that happened in the past becomes impossible. Therefore,, the dark soul of samskāra
is an eternal substance, it is not transitory.
When the soul is transitory, worldly uses also cease.
The relationship between father and son is destroyed, because the father is the
father of son, the second moment of production is destroyed. A newly born soul
cannot be called Janaka because it does not have Janaka. Moreover, we have the
classical practice of wishing the child good luck before the birth of the
child. Maharishi Kapil refuted the transience of the soul in this argument.
Buddhists say that every moment the soul perishes, but from moment to moment
the flow of the enlightened soul continues, so there is samskāra
or Pratyabhijńā.
Now the Naiyāyika ask, is this momentary soul different from
its child? If it is different, how will the other soul remember the object
received by one soul, it is misused. And if it is not different, then the child
is also temporary according to the argument of ‘most momentary’, so he does not
have the ability to remember. If the child is a single substance separate from
the child, the decision ‘at least for a moment’ would be lost, so the Naiyāyika would declare him to be the eternal soul.
Now it may
be objected that impermanent objects have birth and death. But accepting the
birth and death of impermanent objects disturbs impermanence. According to Vaināśika Buddhism, the soul has origin and
annihilation, so the birth of the soul and death and rebirth after death are
possible according to them, which is irrelevant to the immortality of the soul.
In reply to the objection of the Pūrvapakṣa-vădi , the Naiyāyika say that Pretyabhāva
i.e. rebirth after death cannot disturb the permanence of the soul. The
immortality of the departed soul is what makes the ghost possible. The word pretyabhava does not mean the rebirth of the perished soul,
but the re-incarnation of an imperishable soul after the destruction of the
body.
‘Pra’ purvaka- ‘in’ dhatu means
death and ‘bhu’ dhatu means death after origin, i.e.
birth after annihilation, the Buddhists say. But if the soul is called Pratyabhăva by admitting the origin and destruction of the
soul, the soul that has done the work before, the soul does not remain till the
time of fruition, its “Kritahani” fault. And the soul
which is not the doer of the previous action but is the beneficiary of that
previous action is guilty of “Akritavagyam”. Both of
these are absurd. So the commentator Vatsayana rejects this meaning as “kritahani” and “akritabhagyam”
are doshas respectively if we take this meaning of pratyabhava
in Buddhism.
The
foregoing argument of the commentator will hold good for those who hold the
view that the soul is perishable, and that all matter is subject, therefore the
soul is subject, and that the body arises from the subject. That is, if there
is no soul after death, it is impossible to enjoy the supernatural results of
the soul’s karma, and if the soul has a hetu, that
is, if the soul originates with the body, without this soul, it becomes
impossible to enjoy the results of its previous karma. Thus the sages who are
benevolent to all living beings, who have given advice on performing virtuous
deeds and abstaining from unwholesome deeds, become fruitless. Therefore
evangelism and rationalism about the soul are not acceptable.
Therefore, it is proved by all our arguments that the
soul is a permanent substance in the past, the middle and the hereafter. Atman
originates indestructible, decaying, and growing, eternal and beginningless,
and though old, is eternally new. Even if the body perishes, the soul never
perishes.
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